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Urban Policy: Does Political Structure Matter? 
DAVID R. MORGAN 
JOHN P. PELISSERO 
University of Oklahoma 
An interrupted time-series quasi-experiment is employed to test the basic hypothesis that reformed 
cities (with city manager, at-large elections, and nonpartisan ballots) tax and spend less than 
unreformed communities. Eleven cities with populations of 25,00() and above which significantly 
changed their political structure between 1948 and 1973 are compared with 11 matched control cities 
that made no changes. We found that over an II-year period, variations in fiscal behavior were vir-
tually unaffected by changes in city g~vernment structure. 
Among scholars of state and local government, 
the question is still debated: do politics and 
governmental structure have any independent in-
fluence on policies? Although much state-level 
research suggests the answer is clearly yes, con-
siderably less agreement exists for the local level. 
Most research directed toward this issue at the ur-
ban level has probed the political effects of 
reformed institutions. Presumably urban 
reformers, who sought to replace the political ma-
chine with good government devices, sought cer-
tain policy goals as well. Just what those goals 
were and how successful these groups have been 
in acheiving them remains unsettled. Some argue 
that one of the consequences of the reform move-
ment's "public-regarding" ethos was to provide 
greater support for spending on community-wide 
public improvements. Others disagree. They con-
tend that cities with reform institutions tend to be 
less responsive to their socioeconomic en-
vironments, which presumably causes such 
municipalities to be less sensitive to the higher 
spending demands of lower-income and minority 
interests. The result, according to the latter argu-
ment-lower levels of taxing and spending. Thus 
the issue for local government remains unsettled. 
The argument over the political consequences 
of urban reform has been clouded by several 
methodological disputes. One of the most impor-
tant relates to time order. For example, Lineberry 
AND Fowler (1967, p. 707) insist that one well-
known analysis of the reform movement's effect 
on city government structure (Wolfinger and 
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Field, 1966) is flawed in a causal sense because ob-
vious time order assumptions are violated; in-
dependent variables (census data) are used to ex-
plain decisions (government structure) made at an 
earlier period. Yet none of the research on this 
topic systematically includes a time element; it has 
all been cross-sectional in design. The research 
reported here offers a different approach-a time-
series analysis-in an effort to shed further light 
on this basic question. 
Public Policy Implications of Municipal Reform 
One of the most pervasive themes concerning 
the effect of municipal reforms derives from the 
public-regarding thesis first proffered by Banfield 
and Wilson (1963; p. 46). According to these 
authors, certain subcultural groups within the ci-
ty, constituted on ethnic and income lines, sought 
a more rational, efficient, and honest city govern-
ment. These groups presumably based their 
political preferences on some conception of the 
public interest as a whole in contrast to a more 
narrow ward or neighborhood orientation. As a 
principal means of promoting these goals, such 
public-regarding groups pushed the "good 
government" agenda of municipal reforms. Such 
institutional arrangements as council-manager 
government, nonpartisan ballots, and at-large 
elections seem entirely consistent with the com-
mitment of these groups to minimizing partisan-
ship and particularism in favor of the universal 
values of the larger community. 
The public-regarding ethos had other political 
results as well. A concern for the larger whole, 
according to Banfield and Wilson, might lead to 
support for various community-wide projects and 
improvements. Indeed, Wilson and Banfield 
(1964) show that certain putatively public-
regarding groups tended to vote against their self-
interest, narrowly conceived, in favor of expen-
diture proposals that would raise their taxes. 
Others (Boskoff and Zeigler, 1964, pp. 46-47; 
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Uyekf, 1966) find a similar association between 
upper-status groups and support for bond elec-
tions for municipal improvements. Thus the 
causal sequence is complete-an upper-middle 
class public-regarding ethic should yield two 
results-municipal reforms and greater expen-
ditures for public improvements. 
This line of reasoning has not been so obvious 
to many. In fact, the whole public-regarding ethos 
has been rather severely challenged. Hennessey 
(1970) avers that the approach is not a genuine 
theory and, further, that it was tested with ag-
gregate voting statistics although it was clearly 
applicable only to individual voting behavior. 
Others have failed to find evidence to sustain the 
ethos hypothesis (Wolfinger and Field, 1966; 
Bowman, Ippolito, and Levin, 1972; Duran, 
1972). Miller and Bennett (1974) even insist that a 
subsequent effort at revisiting the ethos formula-
tion by Wilson and Banfield (1971) contains a 
serious methodological flaw that disproves the 
whole concept. 
Despite the problems associated with the ethos 
notion, the most widely referenced study on the 
effects of reforms on city fiscal behavior begins 
with that premise. Lineberry and Fowler (1967) 
argue that reformers were especially hostile to the 
political machine's attempt to capitalize on com-
munity cleavages-class, ethnic, racial, or 
religious. Reforms were presumably desired as a 
way of insulating municipal governments from 
such divisive social forces. One of their basic pur-
poses was to determine if indeed reform govern-
ments responded differently from nonreformed 
governments to their socioeconomic environment. 
Their analysis of tax and expenditure burdens in 
cities of 50,000 and over confirms this expecta-
tion. Socioeconomic variables were much more 
closely associated with taxing and spending in 
unreformed than in reformed cities.! But what 
about tax and expenditure levels? Contrary to the 
public-regarding view, reform cities had lower tax 
and expenditure burdens. They infer from this 
finding that reformed institutions indeed do max-
imize the power of the middle class, but that 
lIn fact, Wright (1976) has challenged Lineberry and 
Fowler's conclusion, arguing that their research is 
flawed because correlation coefficients are used in com-
paring groups of cities. He insists the proper compari-
son is between unstandardized regression coefficients. 
When Wright further tests the Lineberry and Fowler 
thesis using a multiple regression model in which the 
slope of each SES variable is allowed to vary within each 
category of reform, he finds no support for their posi-
tion. "None of the SES variables becomes systematical-
ly less strongly related to policy outputs as reformism 
increases" (p. 369). 
group apparently wants less, not more, public 
spending. 
This finding that reforms produce lower spend-
ing commitments is not inconsistent with another 
body of thought regarding the goals of municipal 
reformers. Hays (1964) contends that the 
municipal reform movement was dominated by 
the upper class with extensive support from 
business organizations. Such groups, who had lit-
tle need for high-priced social programs, were 
primarily interested in having traditional 
housekeeping services economically provided. 
Business-oriented reformers were also eager to 
create a favorable climate for profit-making in the 
city, providing another motive for municipal effi-
ciency (Judd, 1979, pp. 111-12). According to this 
reasoning, reform structures should lead to lower 
levels of taxing and spending, just as Lineberry 
and Fowler (1967) and others find (Lyons, 1978). 
Finally, some contend that reforms make no 
real policy differences. Presumably, both struc-
ture and policy are the result of the same antece-
dent influences, either region (Wolfinger and 
Field, 1966; Cole, 1971) or the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the community (Hawkins, 1971, 
Ch.3). 
In sum, despite the provocative public-
regarding thesis, most research suggests that 
municipal reforms should either reduce taxing or 
spending or have little noticeable effect. As in-
dicated above, all these studies, regardless of their 
findings, have been cross-sectional in design. Or 
at least changes in government structure over time 
have not been examined for their possible effect 
on policy variations. No attempt has been made 
to assess policy changes among cities that have 
altered their government institutions. Surely the 
debate over the potential policy consequences of 
the local political system should not be settled 
solely on the basis of cross-sectional findings. We 
need to consider what happens to certain 
municipal policies over a period of time when a 
city changes its basic political structure. 
Research Design 
We employ a quasi-experimental time-series 
design (Campbell and Stanley, 1966; pp. 55-57) to 
test the policy effects of municipal reform. Two 
groups of cities are required, one in which a 
change takes place and a comparable group not 
undergoing the experimental change from which 
similar "control" time-series data can be 
gathered. The design not only controls for virtual-
ly all the customarily ldentified threats to internal 
validity, but also it readily lends itself to public 
policy applications (see Meier, forthcoming). 
In this analysis, government structure 
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represented by the elements of reform (city 
manager, at-large representation, nonpartisan 
elections) serves as the independent variable. 
Among cities with populations of 25,000 and 
above, eight cities were found that changed a com-
pletely unreformed structure to a totally reformed 
government during a single year between 1948 and 
1973. Another three cities were found that began 
with all of the reform elements and dropped at 
least two of these in a single year. Z Apparently on-
ly one city, since 1950, has dropped all three 
reform elements in a single year. A second group 
of eleven cities, which began with the same form 
of government and maintained this structure, 
were matched to specific cities in the first group. 
Cities that experienced a change in government 
structure constitute the "experimental" group 
and those cities that did not become the 
"control" or "match" group. Table 1 includes 
both groups of cities, the year of structural change 
for the experimental cities, and the structural 
components. 
A brief comment should be made regarding the 
matching procedure. The following criteria were 
employed to select the matching cities: (1) a com-
parable form of government with the experimen-
tal city before the change; (2) similar economic 
base; (3) a similarity in one of the dependent var-
iables, per capita general revenue. Matching by 
both economic base and per capita general reve-
nue should minimize the possibility that observed 
changes in fiscal behavior over time might result 
from differing socioeconomic characteristics be-
tween the pairs of cities. One additional important 
characteristic of our cities should be noted-func-
tional responsibility. Differences in spending as-
signments among cities must be considered when 
expenditures are analyzed. This is particularly 
true for schools and welfare, since these two very 
expensive activities can account for about half the 
variation in total general municipal expenditures 
(Liebert, 1974, pp. 771-72). Our experimental and 
control cities are perfectly congruent on school 
and welfare responsibilities. 
The time-series analysis includes an examina-
tion of 7 revenue and expenditure variables over 
an II-year period-the year of change and 5 years 
before and after that intervention. The dependent 
variables consist of per capita measures of (1) 
general revenue, (2) general expenditures, (3) 
police expenditures, (4) fire expenditures, (5) 
'Although the decision to treat municipal reforms as 
additive is debatable (see Lyons, 1977), Bryant (1976) 
has shown that the three customarily used items (with 
commission form considered as a reform structure) do 
meet the .90 criterion for a Guttman scale using all cities 
having populations of 25,000 and over. 
highway expenditures, (6) sanitation expen-
ditures, and (7) parks and recreation expendi-
tures.3 We would prefer to have additional mea-
sures that could be used to assess differences in 
spending for social programs, but our fiscal mea-
sures represent all such data of any consequence 
consistently available from the Census Bureau 
over the past several decades. 
Findings 
Although results of an interrupted time-series 
design are often displayed graphically, visual 
examination may be inconslusive. Thus it is 
necessary to test for the effects of the intervention 
statistically. McCain and McCleary (1979) offer a 
method for performing an ordinary regression 
that estimates the parameters for the initial level 
of spending, the slope (spending trend over time), 
change in level, and change in slope (both poten-
tially resulting from the intervention). These po-
tential effects can be represented with the follow-
ing regression equation: 
Yt = al + b 1X lt + b2X2t + b3X 3t + et· 
In this equation the independent variable Xlt is 
a linear measure of time such that Xlt equals 1,2, 
3, ... , N. The parameter b l is the slope of the 
series. X 21 is a dummy variable where X 21 = 0 
before the reform change and X 21 = 1 after the in-
tervention. The parameter b2 thus represents the 
alteration in level (intercept) following reform 
change. Variable X 31 is also a dummy "counter-
variable" where X 31 = 0 before the intervention 
and X 31 = Xlt after the intervention (Le., 1, 2, 3 
... ). The parameter b3 represents the post-inter-
vention change in slope. If the parameters b2 and 
b3 are not statistically significant,4 we may accept 
'Data sources for these variables include U.S. Bureau 
of the Census, City Government Finances (1945-1978); 
International City Management Association, Municipal 
Year Book (1945-1978); and the Rand McNally 
Commercial Atlas and Marketing Guide (1945-1978), 
which provided estimates of city populations for use in 
calculating the per capita measures for non-census peri-
ods. Capital outlays have been removed from all expen-
ditures where the data permit, i.e., general expenditures 
and highways (capital expenditures could not be exclud-
ed, however, for any of the 1940s data). Where the 
breakdown was available (since 1960), sanitation expen-
ditures do not include sewerage. 
"Although tests of statistical significance are not 
strictly applicable to data representing a total popula-
tion, such tests are commonly employed as a way of de-
picting "sizable" relationships. Because of the small 
number of time points in the analysis and the need to 
emphasize changes that are more than minimal, only 
those changes in the intercept and slope that reach the 
.01 level of significance are reported. 
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the I1JJIl hypothesis that reform interventions pro-
duced no effect. In the opposite case, if these two 
parameters are significant, we must then look for 
autocorrelation before we may assume that re-
forms made a difference. Note that the formula 
to be used consists of only the three time-related 
variables; no measures of the social and economic 
characteristics of the cities are included. Omission 
of the usual socioeconomic variables appears 
justified for three reasons. Assuming the match is 
well done, the pairs of cities should be similar in 
certain fundamental ways. Second, as the subse-
quent analysis will reveal, the level of explained 
variance for almost all the equations is so high 
that any additional independent variables would 
add virtually no explanation. Finally, with an N 
Table 1. Experimental and Control Cities, Government Structure and Economic Base 
()V = 22) 
Year of. Econowic Government Structure
C 
A. Experimental Change8 Base Before Change After Change 
1. Council Bluffs, Iowa 1951 T MC-M-P CM-A-NP 
2. Peoria, illinois 1954 Mr MC-W-P CM-A-NP 
3. Rock Island, lllinois 1954 Mm MC-W-P CM-A-NP 
4. Brockton, Massachusetts 1958 Mm MC-M-P CM-A-NP 
5. Huntington, West Virginia 1958 Mr MC-M-P CM-A-NP 
6. Little Rock, Arkansas 1958 Rm MC-W-P CM-A-NP 
7. Independence, Missouri 1962 Rm MC-W-P CM-M-NP 
8. Great Falls, Montana 1973 Rr MC-W-P CM-A-NP 
9. Worcester, Massachusetts 1950 Mm CM-A-NP MC-W-P 
10. Kenosha, Wisconsin 1958 Mm CM-A-NP MC-W-NP 
11. Brockton, Massachusetts 1962 Mm CM-A-NP MC-M-NP 
Economic Government 
B. Control Baseb Structuree 
1. Davenport, Iowa Rm MC-M-P 
2. Terre Haute, Indiana Mr MC-M-P 
3. Muncie, Indiana Mm MC-M-P 
4. Cranston, Rhode Island Mm MC-W-P 
5. Hammond, Indiana M MC-M-P 
6. Charleston, West Virginia Rr MC-M-P 
7. Berwyn, lllinois Rr MC-W-P 
8. Billings, Montana Rr MC-W-P 
9. Hartford, Connecticut M CM-A-NP 
10. Clifton, New Jersey Mm CM-A-NP 














Source: International City Management Association,Municipal Year Book (1945-1978), Washington, D.C. 
aFirst year city altered government structure. 
bCities classified according to employment patterns, as follows: 
T =Transportation center (25 percent or more reported transportatiun as occupation) 
Mm =Manufacturing city (50 percent employed in manufacturing) 
Mr =Diversified city (employment in manufacturing dominant but less than 50 percent) 
Rr =Retail trade city (retail employment is greater than that in wholesale trade, service, or 
manufacturing) 
Rm = Diversified city (retail employment dominant, manufacturing employment at least 20 percent) 
cForrn of government, representation, and ballot type, as follows: 
CM =City manager form 
MC =Mayor-council form 
A =At-Iarge representation 
W = Representation by ward or district 
NP = Nonpartisan ballot 
P = Partisan ballot 
dNumber of reform elements present after change. 
eConstant structural arrangements during the period analyzed. 
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of 11 (time points), adding more explanatory 
variabfes runs the risk of overdetermining the 
equation and exhausting the needed degrees of 
freedom. 
Here we should note that the dependent 
variables in the analysis to follow are mean figures 
for cities grouped into four categories-more 
reformed experimental cities (N = 8), less re-
formed experimental cities (N = 3), and the two 
groups of control cities. This averaging process 
permits us to report far fewer equations and has 
the additional advantage of smoothing out any 
potential abrupt changes in spending peculiar to a 
given municipality.s Nonetheless, as an additional 
precaution, a separate time-series analysis was 
undertaken for each individual city, the results of 
which are summarized below. 
The results of the initial analysis are found in 
Table 2. The regression coefficients are shown for 
each variable along with the degree of statistical 
significance for each and the level of explained 
variance (Rl) for the equation. Our first concern is 
to determine how many statistically significant re-
lationships exist for variables 2 (intercept) and 3 
(slope). In fact, few significant differences are 
found for the two variables. For the total of 28 
equations only 9 reflect statistical significance at 
the .01 level for either variable 2 or 3. More than 
this only 4 of these 9 equations show statistical 
significance for those cities undergoing structural 
change. Otherwise all significant changes are for 
control cities. As with any time series, our results 
must also be tested for autocorrelation. If serial 
correlation is present, the differences between the 
pre-intervention and post-intervention period is 
likely to be overstated (Ostrom, 1978, p. 29). We 
might thus conclude in our case that reforms 
made a difference when in fact they did not. Our 
test is made using a procedure developed by Pack 
(1977), which is actually the first step in the Box-
Jenkins (1970) method for identifying autocorre-
lation. If the Q statistic produced by the test, 
shown in Table 2, is not significant (using a chi-
square distribution), no autocorrelation exists.' 
'With a small number of cases, especially with the 
possibility of considerable variation on certain 
variables, one might consider standardizing the 
variables before averaging. For each city, the per capita 
measure for every year was converted to a Z-score for 
each of the 7 functional categories. These standardized 
values were then used in the time-series analysis describ-
ed in the text. Only a few changes resulted, which ap-
peared to be so minor that we felt justified in omitting 
the standardization procedure and have reported the 
data on a per capita basis to make interpretation easier. 
'We are greatly indebted to Ken Meier for making 
available the computer program necessary to generate 
the Q statistic. 
Using the less demanding .05 level, only one of the 
nine significant intercepts and slopes reflects auto-
correlation. Since the autocorrelation is for a con-
trol group, we may safely ignore it; it will not af-
fect our basic hypothesis concerning the impact of 
reform structures. 
One more basic issue must be addressed at this 
point. Four equations involving experimental 
cities did contain significant changes apparently 
resulting from the intervention. But what about 
the direction of change? If the change in spending 
is not in the right direction, reform does not pro-
duce the expected impact. The results of these 
four equations showing the direction of change 
for the intercept or slope is as follows (positive 
direction means spending increased; negative di-
rection, the opposite): (1) general expenditures for 
less reformed cities have a positive slope change; 
(2) police spending in more reformed cities shows 
a positive intercept change; (3) sanitation spend-
ing for more reformed communities manifests a 
positive intercept change; and (4) highway expen-
ditures in less reformed municipalities reflect a 
positive slope change. 
All the changes are positive, indicating more 
than expected increases in spending following 
structural change. But note that two of the equa-
tions-police and sanitation spending-are for 
groups of cities that became more reformed. 
Those cities, in line with the presumed effect of 
reforms, should have spent less after the struc-
tural change took place. So, in all, for 28 tests of 
the effects of reform, only two structural changes 
(7 percent) produce the expected modifications in 
revenue and spending levels. Moreover, just as 
many significant effects of structural change 
among experimental cities are in the wrong direc-
tion. These findings clearly do not bode well for 
the theoretical assumptions growing out of the re-
form literature. 
The relationship between municipal reforms and 
policy changes were tested in three other ways. 
First, a time-series analysis was performed for 
each city separately (without averaging). Of the 39 
significant changes (in intercept or slope) of a 
total 156 possible, 16 occurred among experi-
mental cities. But exactly half of these changes 
were in the wrong direction. Second, each ex-
perimental city was compared directly with its 
control counterpart for each of the 7 policies. Of 
the 11 cases where an experimental city reflected a 
change that was not found in its control, 6 were in 
the wrong direction. Finally, changes in spending 
patterns among the functional areas were exam-
ined by calculating the percentage of general ex-
penditures devoted to each of four spending cate-
gories. These data were then employed as depen-
dent variables in a similar time-series analysis. In 
only two equations did statistically significant var-
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Table 2. Regression Coefficients for OLS Equation for All Sets of Cities 
., to Test for Significance of Change in Reform Structure (Betas in Parentheses) 
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable F· Intervention F· Intervention F· Pack's 
(per capita) Time Value Intercept Value Slope Value R2 Q* 
General Revenue 
More Reform (N = 8) 4.09 <.01 4.28 ns .00 ns .98 
( .86) ( .14) ( .00) 
Control (N = 8) 3.95 <.01 5.32 <.01 -1.60 ns .99 4.34 
(1.00) ( .21) (-.23) 
Less Reform (N = 3) 6.37 <.01 -1.40 ns -.84 ns .98 
(1.09) (-.04) (-.08) 
Control (N = 3) 8.85 <.01 -8.37 ns -2.07 ns .98 
(1.30) (-.19) (-.17) 
General Expenditures 
More Reform 4.00 <.01 6.46 ns -.22 ns .97 
( .82) ( .21) (-.03) 
Control 3.54 <.01 10.20 <.01 -1.48 ns .99 8.84** 
( .82) ( .37) (-.19) 
Less Reform 6.10 <.01 -9.37 ns 6.08 <.01 .99 4.51 
( .76) (-.18) ( .42) 
Control 10.41 <.01 1.86 ns -1.76 ns .98 
(1.05) ( .03) (-.10) 
Police Expenditures 
More Reform .41 <.01 1.10 <.01 .13 ns .99 2.58 
( .64) ( .27) ( .12) 
Control .50 <.01 .53 <.01 .01 ns .99 3.48 
( .86) ( .14) ( .01) 
Less Reform .36 <.01 -.58 ns .32 ns .97 
( .79) (-.20) ( .39) 
Control .79 <.01 -.87 ns .24 ns .98 
( .98) (-.17) ( .17) 
Fire Expenditures 
More Reform .62 <.01 -.11 ns -.35 ns .91 
(1.34) (-.04) (-.42) 
Control .48 <.01 2.01 <.01 -.27 ns .98 4.81 
( .75) ( .49) (-.24) 
Less Reform .36 ns -.43 ns .22 ns .88 
( .81) (-.15) ( .28) 
Control .90 <.01 1.17 ns -.63 <.01 .97 1.63 
(1.12) ( .24) (-.46) 
Sanitation Expenditures 
More Reform .38 ns 7.02 <.01 -.84 ns .84 3.37 
( .33) ( .95) (-.40) 
Control .72 ns -3.53 ns 1.82 ns .81 
( .53) (-.41) ( .75) 
Less Reform .41 ns .21 ns .25 ns .55 
( .54) ( .04) ( .18) 
Control 1.00 <.01 -1.89 ns -.36 ns .74 
Parks Expenditures (1.44) (-.43) (-.30) 
More Reform .06 ns .29 ns .49 ns .88 
( .16) ( .11) ( .69) 
Control .43 <.01 .74 ns -.57 ns .79 
0.36) ( .37) (-1.02) 
Less Reform .22 ns -.05 ns .05 ns .83 
( .84) (-.03) ( .11) 
Control .32 <.01 -.35 ns -.08 ns .83 
0.23) (-.21) (-.17) 
continued 
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Table 2. (continued) 
.., 
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable F- Intervention F- Intervention F-
R2 
Pack's 
(per capita) Time Value Intercept Value Slope Value Q* 
Highway Expenditures 
More Reform _64 <_01 1.80 ns -_58 ns .92 
( _98) ( .44) (-_50) 
Control .32 <.01 _60 ns -.18 ns .92 
( .97) ( .29) (-.31) 
Less Reform -.36 <.01 .92 ns .64 <.01 .74 3.37 
(-1.41) ( .58) (1.42) 
Control .37 ns 2.29 ns -.48 ns .83 
( .70) ( .69) (-.52) 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, City Government Finances (1945-1978); International City Management 
Association, Municipal Year Book (1945-1978) (Washington, D.C.); Commercial Atlas and Marketing Guide 
(1945-1978) (Chicago: Rand McNally). 
*The Q statistic may be compared with a X2 distribution, where a value of 7.815 is necessary for statistical 
significance at the .05 level (**). Unless the Q is significant, no autocorrelation is deemed to exist. 
iations in slope or intercept appear for experimen-
tal cities, and one of these was in the wrong direc-
tion. Changing structure does not seem to matter 
much in allocating funds across different func-
tional areas. 
Conclusion 
Disagreement persists over the potential policy 
consequences of urban political structures. Most 
of the prior attempts to investigate this linkage 
have dealt with the question of whether municipal 
reforms should induce cities to tax and spend 
more or less than unreformed cities. Despite Ban-
field and Wilson's widely known thesis suggesting 
that cities dominated by a middle-class public-
regarding ethos may support greater public expen-
ditures, a larger body of research tends to support 
the view that reformers wanted efficient, business-
like government with lower levels of spending. To 
complicate matters further, others have shown 
that reform characteristics have little or no impact 
on municipal spending levels. The research re-
ported here, employing an interrupted time-series 
design for 22 cities over an ll-year period, gener-
ally confirms that changes in city government 
structure have almost no impact on changes in 
taxing and spending levels. We also discovered no 
consistent reallocation of expenditures among 
functional categories following changes in munici-
pal structure. 
This research represents the first attempt to 
analyze the effects of local government structure 
on policy using a genuine longitudinal design. If 
we accept the argument of Gray (1976) and others 
that theoretically policy making should be viewed 
as a process occurring over time, we believe our 
dynamic model is preferable to a cross-sectional 
analysis. Admittedly, this research is not likely to 
settle this dispute permanently-our findings are 
confined to fiscal variables, the time span is 
somewhat limited, and a relatively small number 
of cities are involved. Clearly something compara-
ble to this analysis should be undertaken, where 
appropriate longitudinal data can be located, for 
other policy measures. Given these constraints, 
none of which we believe seriously limits what we 
have done, the findings are nonetheless unam-
biguous-urban reforms have few policy conse-
quences. 
What might we conclude about the efficacy of 
the reform movement based on these findings? 
There is a widely shared view that this group was 
largely successful in its effort to rid the cities of 
pernicious machine influences; presumably 
today's municipalities are more honestly gov-
erned, more efficient, and better managed than 
was true in the past. But the evidence offered here 
suggests these changes had little long-range effect 
on basic fiscal decisions. If the reformers wanted 
to keep the lid on city spending (which in itself is 
still arguable), they were not successful. No at-
tempt is made here to minimize the overall import 
of the reform movement. Indeed, a number of 
community battles have been waged over the 
adoption of reform structures. Yet in the long 
run, government structure may matter very lit-
tle-at least when it comes to city taxing and spen-
ding policies. 
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